Introduction
Don Francisco Ubaque's Spanish associates marveled at his appearance. In testimony collected for an información de oficio, the cream of Spanish colonial society (encomenderos, scribes, administrators, and high-ranking clerics from the cathedral) attested that don Francisco Ubaque »even though an Indian, is a well-refined man whose behavior is that of a Christian and a Spaniard, with great policía,« which they compared to that of a Spanish caballero, since he dressed in Spanish attire, carried a Spanish sword, and also rode a horse. They lauded his orthodox Catholicism, his hatred of idolatry, and the fact that he willingly carried a torch in the Corpus Christi procession. They especially celebrated the fact that he emulated the »good customs of Spaniards« in his public behaviors and personal interactions.
1 On the surface, these remarks tell the story of the mimesis of the colonial encounter.
2 But underneath the veneer of flattery and mirror-gazing, these comments would act to introduce a contentious legal issue that penetrated to the heart of the colonial legal order.
The above-cited testimony formed part of an information-gathering process that had started in 1578, aimed at changing inheritance law for the inhabitants of indigenous settlements of the northern Andes, in a region of the Spanish Empire known as the New Kingdom of Granada (roughly coterminous with modern Colombia). The instigator of the process was the attorney Juan de Aldaz, representative of don Francisco, the cacique of the sizeable and politically-important settlement of Ubaque. Aldaz's specific request included alterations to indigenous inheritance law that would allow the cacique's son to inherit leadership responsibility for Ubaque (rather than a nephew or, in the absence thereof, a successor chosen by village notables). As such, the request threatened to overturn a longstanding custom in the native community that pre-dated Spanish conquest. Rather than effecting change within his community with the blessing of its members, don Francisco had chosen to appeal to the Crown's administrators to force the change. But as he did, he ran into obstacles. And, as it turned out, he was not the only indigenous leader making such a proposal at this time. More on that in a moment.
In the coming pages, I look to conflict over indigenous inheritance law in one small corner of the 16 th -century empire to open a window onto Spanish justice more generally. After briefly considering the local ramifications of this dispute, I turn to the wider Hispanic world in surrounding centuries to understand how these events in the colonies reflect long-term legal traditions. I am specifically interested in the mechanisms that placed custom -unwritten norms -at the center of early modern Spanish legal theory, and made the Spanish monarchy one especially adapted to incorporating diverse social elements. By focusing on custom and its relationship to the maintenance of diversity over such a long period, I am consciously thinking about the legacy of Iberian convivencia both within and outside of its traditional medieval frame. The 16 th century in the Spanish Empire is typically seen as a period of rupture, during which the formerly tolerant land of three religions 3 transformed under the punishing watch of the Inquisition, as Judaism and Islam disappeared from the Iberian map for a period of centuries. It is uncommon, for instance, to include post-conquest society in the Americas -characterized in the historiography as a product of Christian zealotry -within the framework of convivencia. Yet on both sides of the Atlantic, amidst all the narratives about the extinguishment of alterity, the persecution (and even expulsion) of Jews, Muslims, and Moriscosthere still existed visible spaces of autonomy in the very structure of the Spanish monarchy that attested to a value on lived diversity, however paradoxical such a claim might sound.
The term convivencia, first employed in the historiography as a surreptitious way to critique the unwavering cultural essentialism of the Franco dictatorship in Spain, is now widely employed in the political arena (especially in the Spanish-speaking world) to communicate the social ideal of tolerant coexistence. 4 As an example, in its Nuevo código nacional de policía y convivencia (2016), the Republic of Colombia announced that »conviven-cia is understood as the peaceful, respectful, and harmonious interaction between persons, in reference to belongings and the environment, within the frame of the rule of law.« In the six articles of Title 1, Chapter 2, the code links the achievement of convivencia to the exercise of rights and liberties, the respect and acceptance of differences, the peaceful resolution of public disputes, and the general support for values that in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man might have been framed as liberté and fraternité.
5 Taking this concept -essentially a modern value whose current interpretation is largely the result of social changes from the second half of the 20 th century onwardas a framework for analyzing the past is fraught with pitfalls. I must make clear from the outset that this article does not intend to unearth the roots of modern toleration in the late medieval / early modern Iberian World. Instead, through its review of the historiography, it seeks to understand the aims and the limits of a Castilian legal system, which in its own way also sought to secure the »harmonious interaction between persons … within the frame of the rule of law.« Though for many decades Spain was vaunted as a special historical arena in which legal and cultural pluralism thrived, 6 legal historical studies have indicated similar complexity that was common across Europe.
7 Nevertheless, Jewish communities were perhaps more widely dispersed throughout Spain than they were elsewhere in Europe and Islamic communities lived in a close proximity to Christians that was unthinkable in the rest of the continent. This proximity led to the consolidation of norms and social practices meant to facilitate some modicum of intergroup tolerance. Scholars of colonial Latin America have long looked to this medieval background for interpretative clues to use for understanding the construction of the New World legal order, in which a colorful and diverse mosaic of peoples were incorporated into the Christian, Spanish legal system.
8
It is my hope that by identifying the methodologies and topics of study in historiographies that often remain separate (late medieval / early modern Spain, on one hand, and colonial Latin America, on the other), I will be able to contribute to the cross-fertilization of ideas and be able to signal some promising avenues for integrated or comparative study.
9 In doing so, I am following the lead of other scholars who have proposed and conducted trans-Atlantic comparative study on related legal historical themes.
10
At its root, this essay attempts to see society in the monarchy of Castile (and its ever-growing territories) through the lens of jurisdiction. Late-3 In employing this phrase, I am aware of the historiography that began with Américo Castro, weathered significant critique, especially from Nirenberg (1999) and continues in some shape or form to the modern day. For a relatively recent critical reevaluation, see Soifer (2009 ). 4 Campbell (2016 ; Sakrani (2016) ; Aragoneses (2016) . 5 Nuevo código nacional de policía y convivencia (Ley 1801 de 2016 -Julio 29).
6 For an example of a work celebrating Spanish exceptionalism, see Menocal (2002) . 7 Grossi (1996) . 8 It would be possible to give many examples here. To illustrate I will simply indicate Mcalister (1984) , which is divided into one section devoted to »Old World Antecedents« and two to colonial American society.
medieval Castile, a kingdom that stretched from the Mediterranean to the Bay of Biscay, geographically and demographically dominated the Iberian Peninsula. Nevertheless, Castile maintained a different legal system than did the peninsula's other kingdoms, Aragón and Portugal, even following the union of Aragón and Castile under Isabel and Ferdinand and despite the addition of Portugal between 1580 and 1640. For the sake of simplicity, this article focuses on Castile to the exclusion of the other two kingdoms. The territories of the Indies, since they were incorporated into the monarchy via conquest, remained subordinate components of the kingdom of Castile, even though there were repeated attempts to remodel them as kingdoms of their own, on par with the monarchy's European constituent parts, throughout the 16 th and 17 th centuries.
11
Jurisdiction, as I will examine more at length later in the essay, refers to the ability to administer the law (literally in Latin to »say the law« -»ius dicere«).
12 Though we think of such legal power as residing with the monarch and his or her ministers, it was also inherent to numerous other bodies throughout the kingdom: the Church, municipalities, corporations such as guilds or confraternities, and, for limited times and with certain stipulations, religious minorities. Lauren Benton has accordingly defined it as »the exercise by sometimes vaguely defined legal authorities of the power to regulate and administer sanctions over particular actions or people, including groups defined by personal status, territorial boundaries, and corporate membership.« 13 Both canon law and royal law theoretically stretched across the spaces of empire. At a local level, municipal ordinances complemented those norms. But what is sometimes lost from view is the immense determinative capacity of custom in the Castilian legal matrix. Custom represented more than a nebulous no-man's land of legal action; in what would become the Spanish Empire, it was an esteemed and protected sphere of normativity. The centrality of custom in judicial decision-making virtually assured the protection of significant auto-determination at the local level. Thus, as I focus on newcomers and Others 14 in the Castilian legal system, I reflect on the ways that the system provided for their self-governance according to patterns independent of and pre-existing their integration into the monarchy. This reflection on convivencia focuses on the late-medieval / early modern conception of »republics« -cultural communities oriented toward cohesive action preserving their common good -as the basic unit of study, and on custom (unwritten law) as the basic guarantor of their continuing self-determination.
Contesting Inheritance in the New Kingdom of Granada (ca. 1570 Granada (ca. -1590 In the latter half of the 16 th century, roughly ten thousand Spaniards and a few thousand Africans lived in concentrated settlements throughout the New Kingdom of Granada, surrounded by somewhere between 200,000 and 500,000 indigenous inhabitants.
15 While European settlers largely congregated in a few Spanish cities and towns (Santafé, Tunja, Vélez, Ibague …), it was an overwhelmingly indigenous space. And despite the fact that governance at the level of the pueblo had begun to take on some Spanish characteristics by the last quarter of the 16 th century, the actual framework of the imposed Spanish legal system was rather flimsy. The Spanish presence in indigenous pueblos was limited to a priest, who may or may not have resided there year-round, and a modest amount of non-indigenous through-traffic that increased only gradually with the establishment of Spanish farms (estancias) on their outskirts.
Within those highland Muisca towns of the New Kingdom in which don Francisco Ubaque moved, the pre-Hispanic exercise of authority appeared to have been relatively consistent from settlement to settlement. The highest level of authority had belonged to the usaque (cacique mayor), who governed an array of subordinates across multiple settlements. Local authority over any one particular community was exercised by the sihipkua (Castilianized as zipa, and translated into the nomenclature of Spanish law as cacique). Under the sihipkua, a series of tybas (captains in Spanish parlance) were responsible for the management of a handful of matrilineal family units (gue). Despite the relatively structured appearance of these relationships, tybas were not entirely subordinate to the sihipkua above them, enjoying as they did the ability to uproot their own subjects and re-pledge them to another sihipkua.
16
Political authority was generally inherited in this society, though Spanish administrators quickly discovered that indigenous forms of inheritance (as well as residence patterns) were different than their own. Lines of inheritance -most visibly of public authority -passed down through the maternal line, from uncle to nephew. In general, individuals were understood to belong to the political unit of their mother. Offspring would reside in the settlement of their fathers until their parents died, at which point they were expected to emigrate to live alongside their maternal uncles. Reflecting these dynamics, names of Muisca women contained two parts: one denoting the place of her birth, and the other a particle extracted from the name of her mother. This way, in the words of Santiago Muñoz, »the names of the mother condensed the social and political placement of the children, which did not necessarily coincide with their place of residence, and contained sufficient information to order society and to have a map of its political affiliations.«
17
The Muisca expectation that the progeny would eventually make their way back to the settlement of their maternal uncles created problems in the eyes of 16 th -century Spanish colonists and administrators. The most famous cases involve two mestizo sons of Spaniards, don Alonso de Silva and don Diego de Torres. The two men had been raised in Spanish urban environments, in the company of their fathers.Torres had received an education from Dominicans in Tunja and Silva worked as the assistant to a royal scribe in Santafé (Bogotá). In fact, Silva aspired to become a scribe himself after obtaining royal dispensation for his illegitimate birth.
18 At the same time, both men were also sons of indigenous noblewomen, the sisters of caciques, and, according to indigenous succession patterns, they were the clear inheritors of the mantle of authority. Theirs was a polygamous society, and noble bloodlines were traced along the female line. Indigenous leadership passed from the cacique / sihipkua to the eldest son of his eldest sister. In 1571, both don Alonso and don Diego were approached by principals from their mothers' native communities, who affirmed that the two men were eligible according to these norms, and asked (independently one from the other) that each of the respective men be recognized as their cacique.
19 Though their request existed in a gray area in Castilian law, Spanish authorities assented, and the men accepted their roles. When they almost immediately undertook an activist defense of native interests, however, legal challenges began to come at them from left and right.
20 Both Spanish landed interests and indigenous opponents tried to undermine the legal basis for their leadership. By 1574, that effort had successfully convinced the regional court (Real Audiencia) in Santafé, which then deprived don Alonso and don Diego of their positions of native authority until the Royal Council in Madrid had time to decide the case on appeal.
21
Rather than focus on the variety of arguments that went into the case heard by the regional court, which are numerous and complex, I want to focus on just one -the issue of inheritance and succession. Spanish legal doctrine held that local use and custom should be respected, unless it clearly violated Christian principles or fell in direct contradiction to an express royal imperative. During the course of the litigation, don Alonso de Silva reminded the court of this principle. 22 The opposing legal representative conceded the issue, and instead set out to throw into question whether don Alonso was actually the legitimate successor according to native custom, proposing alternative genealogies 16 Gamboa Mendoza (2010): 65-67. These divisions largely endured into the 17 th century, although the Spanish partition of large polities governed by usaques into smaller repartimientos overseen by different encomenderos functionally did away with the highest level of the hierarchy. 17 Muñoz Arbeláez (2015) 83-84.
Translation mine.
that identified as rightful cacique his close relative don Martin or don Laureano, an obscure candidate from an obscure cacical line. 23 The outcome of don Diego's defense turned on a similar issue. But as the members of the prosecution built their argument, bodies of law mingled. Unable to construct an airtight case (though they did create some doubt) that an alternate claimant to don Alonso's cacicazgo was its rightful heir, they tried out a second argument. They claimed that because don Alonso was illegitimate in the Spanish world (true, though afterward legitimated) 24 and a bastard (possible, via circumstantial evidence) that he could not be considered a legitimate claimant to the indigenous office. Don Alonso countered that indigenous custom recognized nothing similar to Castilian legitimacy; caciques had multiple wives, and the bloodline, rather than a ceremony, legitimated an heir.
25
In the end, though the regional court decided there was sufficient evidence to disqualify both men from their offices -a burgeoning historiography has recognized it as a heavily politicized decision 26 -it recognized and upheld local custom's value as law. Early modern Castilian legal decisions are notoriously sparse on rationale, preferring merely to affirm that justice has been provided without providing elaborate disquisitions explaining why and how.
27 In don Alonso's lawsuit, we do not know which of the arguments swayed their opinion, but we do know that his kin Don Martin was eventually awarded the office of cacique.
28 When Don Diego de Torres, likewise, was deprived of his cacicazgo, it was placed in the custodianship of don Francisco, a first cousin who had an alternate legitimate claim according to indigenous succession.
29
When, beginning in 1578, don Francisco Ubaque lobbied the Crown to overturn indigenous norms on succession, he did so against this historical backdrop. While they were responsible for securing the recognition of royal judges of the validity of this element of customary law, the cases of don Alonso de Silva and don Diego de Torres also had been central elements in a period of intense political instability that ultimately led to a complete replacement of the five-member Audiencia court. It is not an exaggeration to say that the colony stood on the precipice of rebellion for the better part of a decade.
30 It was also a time of rapid cultural change, in which the process of indigenous Christianization finally started in earnest. Don Francisco's entreaty should thus be seen as an opportunistic attempt to use the prejudices of the Spanish judiciary to effect a self-serving -because he had a son but no legitimate nephewoutcome. A handful of other caciques (interestingly including don Alonso de Silva) also made the same effort, all alleging that they did so because of their interest in further Christianizing the native community. They tended to argue that native communities would profit from Castilian (or in their words, ›Christian‹) succession, because it would assure that once leadership was Christianized, successive generations of leaders would also be Christian. This, of course, depended on an understanding in ius commune that progeny of Christians were, by definition, Christians.
31 To continue with indigenous succession patterns was to leave open the door for unbaptized caciques to follow Christian ones.The monarchy showed some interest, but ultimately adhered to a long policy of respecting the validity of customary law for its subjects' local self-governance.
Customs
Where did custom fit in the constellation of colonial law, and did its placement represent a transformation of medieval Iberian precedent, or a continuation? First off, only with the publication of the Recopilación de las leyes de Indias in 1680 did a unified body of law meant for application across the colonies appear. That text reserved a special place for indigenous custom: »We order and command that the laws and good customs that the Indians formerly kept for their government and public order, and their usos and costumbres observed and maintained ever since they have been Christians, and which do not contradict our sacred religion, nor the laws of this book, as well as those that they have newly made and formulated, be preserved and applied; and since it is necessary, through this mandate we approve and confirm that We may add whatever serves our interest, and that which acts in the service of the interests Our Lord God or our own, and the conservation and Christian policía of the natives of those provinces, without harming their achievements nor their good and just customs and statutes.«
32
This adaptation of a 1555 cédula sent by Charles V and its incorporation into the Recopilación, with the consequent generalization across the Indies, provided native norms with an additional level of legitimacy. But what kind of protections had indigenous custom enjoyed before 1680? Customary law -sometimes referred to in medieval and early modern sources as moral law (a term whose etymology traces back to use by Isidore of Seville in the 7 th century) -describes norms elaborated on the basis of customs, habits, and practices.
33 For all the pretentions of royal law, local custom was one of the most important sources that Spanish magistrates drew upon as they made decisions and was a tremendously important source of law in Spain's colonies. For determinations in court, there were two types of custom that magistrates took into account. The first emerged from Spanish criollo contexts and included the corpus of established practices that New World authorities had adapted for emergency circumstances and which had proven durable over a period of years, and had continued in colonial use without explicit contradiction by the monarch.
34 This evolution of practice into law constituted what some might label as »the workings of silent democracy across time.«
35
As kingdoms integrated into the territories of the Castilian Crown, the Indies were subject to Castilian law. 36 In practice, this meant that their existence was regulated by the foundational texts of royal law, which dated in some cases back to the 13 th century. 37 In 1567, the monarchy published the Recopilación de las leyes de estos reynos. Though the Crown had intended to simplify and concentrate preceding Castilian law with its publication, it effectively became one more set of norms upon which a jurist could draw. 38 The Recopilación de Castilla identified current and future royal ordenamientos and pragmáticas as sources of law of first order. It also authorized as supplementary law the Fuero Real (1255) and other municipal fueros to which the Crown had acceded in prior centuries, as long as they were not contradicted by the text of the Recopilación or canon law. In disputes that could not be settled through those channels, the Recopilación recognized the Siete Partidas (1265, of which Gregorio López published a definitive copy, with a gloss, in 1555). 39 In the end, the Siete Partidas proved to be a favored source for New World jurists.
40
And what was the Partidas' stance on custom? The Partidas clearly defined custom as unwritten law, in use for extended periods of time (I. 2. 4). There were guidelines for how custom could be introduced (I. 2. 3/5): 1) it should be the will of the people; 2) it should be confirmed by adjudication (backed up by at least two rulings); 3) it should be reasonable and should not contravene Natural Law or the law of the land; 4) it should exist with the consent of the lord; 5) it should have endured for a 32 ley IV, tít. I, lib. 
41
Instead, it was understood to change over time. Some temporal durability was required -at least ten years for issues of secular jurisdiction and forty for those of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
42 But jurists expected that human communities and their customs would adapt according to the times.
Francisco Cuena Boy's examination of jurisprudence (doctrina) on the question of custom in the New World revealed that there was no major New World innovation in custom's role within the frame of legal determination from the viewpoint of Roman Law. When tribunals sought to determine the validity of a custom, Cuena Boy suggests prior judicial determinations were important in establishing repeated use, as was the survey or inquiry method, whereby elders and authorities within the native community were interrogated about such norms. Witness testimony could be used to establish through extrajudicial acts a certain custom's continuing validity. The one issue that remained somewhat contentious was how many judicial decisions reflecting use would be sufficient to establish custom. Gregorio López, in his famed Gloss of the Partidas (1555), sought to rationalize the fact that the text of the Partidas only required two findings, when the majority of doctrinal texts he reviewed insisted on 30 or more. López reconciled the contradiction by asserting that two decisions was sufficient precedent if accompanied by two other requisites, namely the passage of ten years, and the general knowledge and acceptance of the populace.
43
Under the schema provided by the Partidas (and after a period of equivocation), the Crown recognized the framework by which norms stemming from indigenous self-rule would be recognized when they ended up in Castilian courts. That was the gist of a royal cédula issued in 1530 for New Spain.
44 This cédula in turn led to the publication of a set of capítulos de corregidores (ordinances for chief civil magistrates) that ordered that »good uses and customs« of the Indians be respected as long as they were not contrary to the Christian religion. Subsequently, the 1542 New Laws instructed its New World Audiencias to handle all legal issues involving Indians summarily, and to issue decisions based on indigenous uses and customs (chapter 20) . 45 In 1552, Bartolomé de Las Casas in the face of a mounting counterargument reiterated the contention, stressing that the Crown was obligated by divine law to recognize the normative value of native customs. 46 The famous cédula that a century later was integrated into the Recopilación (2.1.4) soon followed, on 6 August 1555. In case there was any doubt, the Crown repeated its stance in another royal cédula dated 23 September 1580.
47 Caroline Cunill has recently confirmed that following the 1573 publication of the »Ordinances for the Formation of the Description of the Indies« royal administrators had been admonished consistently to be aware of the »customs and traditions in terms of justice that the Indians had prior to the Spanish conquest …« because the Crown intended that they »continue to be governed thereby.«
48
This approach allowed Indies government to function without the need to legislate on a multitude of quotidian issues, big and small, for which local societies had already developed solutions.
49
A number of scholars have foregrounded the interaction between indigenous custom and the Spanish legal system, both for the period immediately 41 Tau Anzoátegui (2001) 63; Miceli (2012) 
57
Though it is tempting to consider the colonial question in a vacuum, custom remained a central component of the legal system in Iberia, too.
58
Throughout the empire, law during this period remained overwhelmingly local.
59 Paola Miceli has demonstrated how the conception of custom as a distinct but parallel source of Law entered into Castilian royal legislation during the medieval period from the corpus iuris civilis through the influence of the ius commune. 60 Through much of the medieval period, custom was the heart and soul of Castilian law. Some of it got immortalized in fueros when the Crown acknowledged the validity of local custom, converting it into legislation in the process. Even as royal law became dominant in 16 th -century Spain, custom remained a crucial tool at the disposal of magistrates as they interpreted jurisprudence to apply to the lawsuits that passed through their salas. 61 The noted jurist and corregidor of Soria and Guadalajara, Jerónimo Castillo de Bobadilla, in his widely-read and cited Política para corregidores y señores de vasallos (1597) proclaimed »And just as judges are obligated to know the laws, and to rule according to them, they are also obligated to know the notorious and public customs of the city and province that they govern, and judge by them [as well].« 62 Accordingly, the Jesuit Francisco Suárez's influential treatment of the subject (book VII) within his ten-part study of law, originally published in 1612, reached a wide audience and remained among the most important early modern jurisprudence.
63 When thinking about custom, these authors focused not necessarily religious or ethnic minority communities, but local particularism more generally. All of this together assured that custom, even in disputes among Iberian Christians, would play a central role in dispute resolution.
64
Christian rulers' evaluation of the validity of the customs of the kingdoms' Jewish and Islamic subjects, and their convert descendants, has its own nuanced chronology. For several centuries, though a Christian monarch ruled over Castile, semi-autonomous Islamic communities continued to live alongside the greater Christian community. These Hispanic Muslims adhered to the Maliki School of Islamic Law. 65 At the local level alfaquíes served as the ulema (religious authorities), 66 who oversaw the Islamic legal tradition as part of a greater umma that stretched across the Islamic world.
67 Following the 1085 fall of Toledo to Christian conquerors, members of these Muslim communities had had to make the hard decision whether to stay and become subjects of a Christian ruler or to emigrate.
68 Those who decided to stay became Mudéjars, a minority whose rights to adjudicate disputes fully between members of its own community was upheld for centuries.
69 Iberian Christian monarchs offered them communal and judicial autonomy as part of a quid pro quo predicated on the Mudéjars' oaths of loyalty.
70
In 1412, however, King Juan II's regent announced that Muslim and Jewish aljamas would be formally deprived of their ability to serve as proprietary courts of first instance. Instead, all suits would thereafter be judged in Christian courts by Christian judges. The new Royal Law did, nevertheless, establish the validity of Islamic and Jewish law as »customs and ordinances« for the adjudication of civil suits within Christian courts of Castile.
71 Romance language translations and compilations of the basic precepts of Islamic law -the Llibre de la çuna e xara and the Breviaro Sunniwere created in the 14 th and 15 th centuries as tools for Christian magistrates tasked with deciding disputes between Muslims.
72
Some limited independent Islamic and Jewish jurisdiction seems to have survived during this period, despite royal pretensions. In practice, the legal reform depriving Islamic and Jewish courts of authority seems to have been unequally applied.
73
The prohibition was thus repeated again in Diaz de Montalvo's 1484 Recopilación 74 and with the impulse of the 1492 expulsion of the Jews would have taken on definitive form, had the monarchy not extended to its new subjects in Granada the right to adjudicate their own cases within the Muslim community according to the »xara e sunna.« 75 Of course, when the monarchy completed the suppression of the first rebellion of the Alpujarras (1499-1500) by forcing the conversion first of all of Granada's Muslims, 76 and then of all Muslims in Castile, the point remained moot. By 1502, Islamic law had ceased to be a valid source of normativity in Castilian courts (though it remained valid in the Kingdom of Aragón until 1526).
77 The 1412 division of Jewish and Islamic norms into ›customs‹, on one hand, and ›ordinances‹, on the other, seemed to suggest that Christian authorities recognized the determinative capacity of both, separately. The issue of the continuing normative validity of ›customs‹ would become an explosive issue in the 1560s.
78
Even though the monarchy successfully replaced Jewish and Islamic autonomous jurisdiction with its own, it still had another competitorseigneurial jurisdiction. Carlos Garriga has traced how the hierarchy between tribunals developed in the late medieval period. Effectively, the Ordenamiento de Alcalá (1348) had identified the monarch as the mayoría de justicia -that is to say, the supreme jurisdiction and final instance of appeal. The concept of a hierarchy of appeals had been imported into secular justice from ecclesiastical circles, where it had first appeared. Garriga argues that the emergence of an appeals process by the end of the 13 th century was an important device for integrating plural political spaces under the power 67 Safran (2013) of a supreme instance. Between 1348 and 1371, the political logic of the kingdom underwent a transition, transforming from feudal vassalage to the incorporation of natural subjects in a corporate political space defined by the head and body analogy, with the King as head and supreme. Until 1371, justice had been dispensed by the monarch in royal hearings (»audiencias públicas del rey«). In that year, the monarchy created an Audiencia court to be staffed by 7-8 judges (oidores), who in legal matters served as functional alter egos of the monarch. Nevertheless, due to significant pushback from the nobility -reluctant to cede appellate power to the King, in diminishment of their ownthe Audiencias would not be fully functional until the advent of the Catholic monarchs, Isabel and Ferdinand, a century later. The 1390 Law of Guadalajara was crucial in extracting the minimum compromise in order to ensure that the hierarchy continued to be observed, at the very least in practice. In that law, the monarchy acknowledged the right (ius cognoscendi de causis appellationum) of magistrates of territorial lords to serve as the first court of appeals for litigation that had been opened on their lands.
79 The Guadalajara legislation formalized the hierarchy between local magistrates (alcaldes ordinarios), superior magistrates (alcaldes mayores and / or corregidores), territorial nobility (señores), and the tribunals of the monarch. In the 16 th century, seigneurial tribunals' role as courts of second instance -coupled with lords' creative maneuvers to protect their autonomy within their territorial borders 80 -created opportunities for noble jurisdictions to serve as safe-havens for persecuted minorities.
81
The Crown's desire to create a hierarchicallyintegrated set of jurisdictions in the Americas, with its own magistrates as ultimate arbiters, provided the motivation for the many of the conflicts that characterized the 16 th century. Prime among these was the refusal to grant temporal jurisdiction (señorío) to encomenderos, granting them only the right to collect tribute in return for their obligations to defend the land and offer Christian doctrina.
82 There, as in Spain, the worry circulated that encomenderos were attempting to arrogate jurisdiction for themselves. Magistrates of the king's Audiencias complained about encomenderos who tolerated behavior that royal law forbade.
83
The anxiety about the Crown's potential loss of effective jurisdiction is what ultimately torpedoed the encomenderos' appeal for perpetual encomienda grants in Peru.
84

Justice and Jurisdiction
The concept of Iurisdictio both designated and defined the role of public power in late medieval and early modern society. Iurisdictio expressed the authority and the obligation both to articulate Law (ius) and to ensure Justice (aequitas).
85 In this late medieval / early modern world, it was understood that monarchs did something akin to channeling the law, rather than creating it; iurisdictio -literally »saying the law« -was declarative, not constitutive. The iurisdictio that rulers exercised did not so much create a legal order, as declare recognition of an already existing order that they promised to protect. Their job was to be respectful readers of nature, interpreting its intention for the harmonious custodianship of society as a whole.
86 Historians have given a name -cultura jurisdiccional (»jurisdictional culture«) -to the legal order that was widely dominant between the late medieval period and the end of the 18 th century. Its undergirding concepts were different enough from our own that they created distinct understandings 79 Helpful visual in Nader (1990) Grossi (1996) 108; 309; Vallejo (1992); Costa (1969) .
about the obligations of magistrates. First of all, the understanding that social order was part of the texture of the universe tended to mute the sense of an individual's voluntarity or will. Second, a ›cor-porative‹ model of society valued the community over the individual. Drawing on medieval analogies, the Christian community was considered the »corpus mysticum ecclesiae« (mystical body of the Church) or »corpus reipublicae mysticum« (the body of the mystical republic). 87 The body analogy allowed theorists to simultaneously talk about society as a unified whole while also explaining away differences between unequal parts. This model of coexisting parts could equally be used to explain unity, integration, and hierarchy between families, cities, and kingdoms. They united all of the elements into a harmonious whole governed by an ordo universal. This society was built on a religious foundation that worked both as social discipline and discourse. Its concomitant impact on the legal system led to intense casuistry 88 that emphasized reasoning against contradiction and according to tradition. In this society, power did not create or constitute, but rather conserved and guaranteed social equilibrium, delivering to each »what he deserved.« This philosophy, inspired by an incorporation of Aristotelian thought into Christian theology, re-conceived Christian society as a unitary body, governed by one universal law. The core values of the cultura jurisdiccional thus simultaneously recognized diversity and inequality, all while assuming that they were part of an inherent order of things and that it was the monarch's job to safeguard that order. The imagery provided by the body analogy served to demonstrate the dominant schema of unity, integration, and hierarchy that sustained jurisdictional culture -a schema that would be reflected throughout society in families, cities, kingdoms, and (later) the empire itself.
89 Francisco de Vitoria articulated such a connection in his relección of De potestate civile: »Just as the human body cannot be preserved as a whole if there is no rationalizing force organizing the articulation of its members, each assisting the other and, above all, assisting the entire human organism, so too would result in the city if each merely tended to his own concerns and everyone ignored the common good.«
90
Republics & Customary Law
The conception of a legal system constructed on the metaphor of the body made room for differentiated constituent parts. This metaphor also facilitated the incorporation into the legal system of subject communities that were at once distinguishable in character and integrated into the whole. How exactly justice worked in those communities continues to be a matter of ongoing and fruitful debate. One of the questions that arises across historiographies (medieval, early modern, and colonial) is exactly what kinds of norms dominated at a local level. Did those communities labeled as infidels (Muslims, Jews, and unbaptized Indians) live in legally pure spaces, where religious or customary law dominated? Did the groups that the Catholic Church occasionally accused of being heretics (conversos, moriscos) live in communities fully penetrated by Castilian ius commune? Or did other sources of normativity compete with royal and ecclesiastical law to shape the juridical landscape of the different corners of empire?
Philosophy of Republics
The Spanish conception of a hierarchical system of justice, all of which terminated in the king as final instance, created a political system that was not ›centralized‹ as much as it was, in the words of Alejandro Agüero, a »república de repúblicas«.
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Hispanic jurists had begun in the late medieval 87 Kantorowicz (2016) . 88 Tau Anzoátegui (1992 period to re-adopt the Classical term »republic« (from Latin res publica) to describe sovereign polities organized under one common authority.
92
Kingdoms were examples par excellence of such republics. Legal theory, elaborated over decades, ascribed to Iberian kings (princeps in the Latin formulation) the right to make laws and provide justice within the republics they governed through the rationale of traslatio imperii -a concept that described the process by which a sovereign people transferred their decision-making power.
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But kingdoms were by no means the only entities circumscribed within the concept of the republic. By the 16 th century, the term república was most often employed to identify cities.
94 Most towns in early modern Castile (including its empire) were self-governing.
95 Their limited autonomy was an outgrowth of the medieval fuero tradition, in which the monarch guaranteed towns under his rule a set of rights and privileges (in the form of ordinances).
96 Historiography in Spain has dedicated a fair amount of effort to understanding the composition and functioning of municipal government in the period that spans the transition from late medieval to early modern.
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But the concept could also be used broadly to encompass all voluntary human communities. In the medieval and early modern periods it could equally be used to describe formations of pueblos, universidades (roughly ›corporative bodies‹, including but not restricted to universities), gremios (unions), and the like.
98 Late medieval theory had divided these corpora into two rough types, the ›personal‹ or ›voluntary‹, on one hand, and the ›real‹, ›natural‹ or ›necessary‹, on the other. While the latter group consists primarily of towns and cities, in the prior group were included groups born of the initiative of founding members, such as confraternities, charitable foundations, and guilds.
99 Legal theory terms such groups functional associations -professional associations or affinity groups that possess a normative dimension 100 -and they formed a fundamental part of the multinormative matrix of the Hispanic world.
Of course, the concept of republic was so general and expansive that it was used to describe any voluntary human community with a normative capacity, including religious ones. In his 1575 publication Repúblicas del mundo, Jerónimo Román used the term to identify religio-political communities.
101 Given this non-exclusive conception of what constituted a republic, an individual could conceivably belong to more than one. All Christians belonged to a Christian republic, and the equivalent could be said of Jews, Muslims, and peoples of empire coming from a discernible religious tradition. The rationale of the Reconquista (1085-1492), which identified the peninsula as a Christian space to be recovered, employed Roman geographical categories to imagine Hispania as a unified space, representing a people whose common good (res publica) was to be protected. This conflation of geographical space with cultural space led early modern (Christian) Spaniards to imagine themselves as members of a common republic, and an especially-well governed one, at that. According to the Castilian translation by patriot Francisco Tamara of Johannes Boemus's El libro de las costumbres de todas las gentes del mundo y de las Indias, »For the administration and government of the republic … all the good customs spread throughout the world, and all the good administration and order (policía), are found together, in their finest form, in our Spain. This relación evidences the tension between a conception of republics based on geography, where all inhabitants of Spain were united as one, and republics based on ethnicity, in which descendants of Muslims might be considered a body apart.
This identification of a Spanish republic -drawing upon a common geographical heritage with shared historical experience -only amplified when some of its members braved the sea to establish new settlements in the Americas. Early administrators in charge of the Americas, such as Juan de Ovando, conceived of this spatial-ethnic republic in the Americas as a binary, with the Spanish Republic existing as the converse to a much more extensive Republic of the Indians.
105 For simplicity's sake, these early administrators and jurists referred to the Republic of the Indians in the singular. But what they saw were a multitude of republics, different ethnic peoples, geographically bounded, sharing language, religion, and customs.
Agüero suggests that we understand the Spanish monarchy as a »república de repúblicas,« home to legion corporate groups, that rather than being governed by one unitary law, was governed by mechanics of conflict resolution that took into account the customs, privileges, concessions, and tolerance accorded to each category of persons.
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Beside cities, various other groups formed part of this constellation of human republics. The most visible in the Hispanic world were the ethnic and religious minorities who, at some point gained some degree of judicial autonomy. Until as late as 1502 in Castile (1526 in Aragón), religious minorities in Spain had the right to self-govern as republics. Between the end of the 15 th century and the third decade of the 16 th century, they were formally liquidated, integrated into the Christian republic, and saw their religious character outlawed. Nevertheless, Morisco aljamas continued to exist in Aragón as (theoretically) Christian entities endowed with certain corporate autonomy into the 17 th century. In the Americas, indios were bestowed with the same category of self-sufficiency. Later, a certain small number of black republics, palenques populated largely by cimarrones, received similar recognition.
107
This plurality of overlapping republics -religious, geographical, municipal, functional -was both the strength and the weakness of the Spanish imperial model. The weakness resulted from the monarchy's auto-definition of Crown territories as uniquely Christian space after 1502. As a result, the hundreds of thousands of non-Christians (Jews and Muslims) in Spain over the course of a very few years saw their customs and mores transformed from acceptable to seditious acts undermining the common good. When the Crown moved to incorporate the Americas 108 as a constituent of the monarchy, special juridical devices were designed to shield the Indians (designation as miserabiles personas, immunity from Inquisition prosecution, etc.) new to the faith from the brunt of this underlying contradiction.
109 As for the strength, it emerged from the multiple articulations linking members of the monarchy in a human web, from functional associations at the level of the neighborhood, to the town or city, and finally to the community of the monarchy at large united under the buen gobierno of the king.
110 The legal system's express understanding that justice was the ultimate goal, and not rigid legality, as well as the value placed upon custom as the interpreter of law, provided the flexibility for each of these communities to self-govern according to the sense provided by local context.
In the following pages, I will briefly examine the concepts and the terms fundamental to understanding the basic structures of jurisdiction and officialdom in the republics organized under the authority of the Castilian king, between 1400 and 1700.
111 Having already introduced the nominally normative structures in »Old Christian« society, here I will focus on republican jurisdiction as it manifested itself among the ›Others‹ of the Castilian monarchy -Jews, Muslims, and New Christians of various ethnic stripes. My review of the historiography here is intended to be indicative; given the enormity of the endeavor, providing an exhaustive list is beyond the boundaries of my abilities. It is also restricted to literature with a strong legal-historical focus, eschewing relevant contextual historiography whose treatment of jurisdictional structures is only incidental. The following examination begins with the medieval period and runs into the early modern period, with an eye to capturing transformations in the relationship between republican government and the monarchy over time.
Muslim Republics in Mudéjar Castile
The most drastic transformation in the medieval Iberian landscape was the peninsula's slow transformation from an Islamic to a Christian space. Many Muslims nevertheless chose to continue living in Iberia after their territories were conquered by Christian kings, despite the fact that the propriety of such a decision was called into question by co-religionists living elsewhere. 
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Raja Sakrani has recently set out some new pathways for further integrating the texts mentioned in this paragraph into legal historical study.
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Numerous studies have sought, with lesser and greater success, to reconstruct the functioning of justice in late medieval Castilian Mudéjar communities.
122 The records of the Military Orders (Santiago, Calatrava, Alcántara, Montesa) can prove instructive. In the famed village of Ricote (Murcia), sources indicate that a group of »viejos« oversaw the administration of the Mudéjar community and its relationship to the comendador of the Military Order (in this case, Ricote was under the jurisdiction of the Order of Santiago). Jurisdictional power at the local level was organized by one alcalde located in Ricote and with authority over Mudéjares living in the surrounding valley.
123 This alcalde was elected annually by the members of all the aljamas in the territories of the Order of Santiago. However, the ability of an elected alcalde to hold office was completely dependent on approval of the comendador, a contrast with Christian city councils also managed by the Order of Santiago. Two alguaciles were the executors of justice, and they were chosen directly by the comendador, as was the almotacén (public inspector of weights and measures) -who the comendador selected from among three »hombres buenos« presented to him by the aljamas. In the case of Murcia, the aljama of Ricote exercised outsized power vis-à-vis its fellow Mudéjars. The six other aljamas were represented by only one regidor. As Miguel Rodríguez Llopis has demonstrated, many New Converts saw the 116 Carmona González (1992) mass conversions of 1500 and 1501 as an excuse to escape from the overbearing oversight of the comendador. Beginning in 1502, and utilizing their identity as Christian (rather than Mudéjar) city councils, the former aljamas of the Order in Murcia elected two alcaldes and two alguaciles each, multiplying the number of locally elected officials. The Order of Santiago, however, through legal appeal eventually succeeded in quashing this democratic impulse. By 1511, the situation had returned to the status quo ante, much to the chagrin of the New Convert community. In terms of the staffing of churches, the former aljama villages suffered an additional injury. Unlike Old Christian town councils, they were not able to choose their own priests. Even though their taxes paid for the upkeep of the village church, the comendador chose the priest and submitted him for approval to the bishop, without the town council ever once intervening.
124
The alcalde (Arabic qadi, a post usually filled by an individual previously qualified as an alfaqui 125 ) in Ricote, as elsewhere, handled disputes in the first instance, and alguaciles assisted in the execution of justice. Appeals would go to the alcalde mayor de las aljamas de Castilla. 126 Subsequent appeal was only possible in front of the king or his council.
127 Discoveries in Murcia related to a mid-16 th -century dispute between municipalities over their respective jurisdictions has revealed an intriguing suggestion that qadis in borderland (Castilian) Murcia in the 15 th century may have been named directly by the Nasrid sultan of Granada.
128 Our view of the internal provision of justice in Nasrid Granada in the 15 th century, prior to conquest, is currently undergoing revision. The latest research asserts that rather than a monarchy, the Nasrid state was ruled as a poliarchy, with multiple administrative centers.
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Jewish Republics in Medieval Castile
The most drastic and heartbreaking episodes of late medieval Iberia revolve around the experiences of its Jewish communities. A series of pogroms in 1391, executed by Christians and propelled by eschatological expectations 130 and the depredations of the plague, drove thousands of Jews to convert, thereby abandoning the protections of Jewish jurisdiction. Notwithstanding this moment of rupture, jurisdictional Judaism did survive into the 15 th century. Urban Jewish communities of Iberia organized in aljamas, like their Islamic neighbors, enjoyed the right to administer justice with limited autonomy. The local Jewish courts (beit din) existed as a recourse for any case in which all litigants were Jewish. Those courts drew from a law based on the Torah (the first five books of the Old Testament), as well as a strong doctrinal tradition (often transmitted orally) of so-called »rabbinic law«. Important Jewish communities in Castile were to be found in Burgos, Cuenca, Segovia, Ávila, Zamora, Murcia, Seville, and above all, Toledo. There is some disagreement in the historiography whether members of the general public (qahal) elected their aljama authorities, or whether the decision was made by a council of notables (adelantados / muqqademim / berourim). A 1264 responsum from the great rabbinical authority, Solomon ibn Adret, to the Jewish community of Saragossa practically confirms that practices of decision-making and representation varied by locality:
»There are places in which all their matters are conducted by elders and their advisors, and there are places in which even the majority does not have the power to do anything without consulting the entire community, and obtaining their consent. And there are places in which they appoint over themselves men for a certain amount of time who act on their behalf in all communal matters, and they are agents over them. I see that you act in this last manner, since you elect officials to represent you known as mukademim.«
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The aljamas were responsible for designating a rabbi (though royal approval was sometimes re- 124 Rodríguez Llopis (1986) . 125 Echevarría Arsuaga (2003b 
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Max Deardorff quired), a judge / legal administrator (dayan), and other officials, such as tax collectors. These authorities would be responsible for the issuance of ordinances (taqqanot).
A typical tribunal within the aljamas would be formed by three judges by necessity familiar with Jewish law, although formal studies in the field were generally not required. But not all communities had tribunals. Both the knowledgeability of the authorities and the existence of a formal tribunal (or not) affected how operative written law from the Torah was in those spaces. In fact, Jonathan Ray has argued that officials in Jewish communities on the medieval frontier often only had a rudimentary understanding of halakha. Consequently, rabbinic authorities recognized local customs (minhag) as the equal of halakha with the potential to supersede it. 13 th -century legal responsa suggest that in spaces without formally organized Jewish tribunals (beit din), community authorities as such (qahal) had more leeway to rule according to custom than did others.
132 Though officially separate from one another, the Jewish aljamas of Castile seem to have begun to cooperate and coordinate amongst themselves, at least since the 14 th century. When the community of Valladolid issued an important set of taqqanot in 1432, a hierarchical process of appeals was for the first time constituted in writing. The figures of the »court rabbis,« members of the local elite nominated (and empowered) by the Crown to serve as ad hoc appeals judges, evolved during the 13 th and 14 th centuries. Only in the 1432 taqqanot was one such »court rabbi« constituted as representative of all Castilian aljamas and nominal head of their jurisdiction.
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The inviolability of this Jewish jurisdiction depended on the sanction of Christian authorities. A 13 th -century fuero from Salamanca reflects the legal space accorded to the Jewish community, as do statutes from other bodies of royal law, including the Siete Partidas and, most notably, the Leyes de Estilo. Jewish tribunals enjoyed jurisdiction over both civil and criminal issues. Nevertheless, the Crown reserved its right to hear appeals on any dispute unsatisfactorily resolved in halakha courts. At the same time, the Castilian Crown also offered Jewish litigants the opportunity to bring their disputes directly into royal courts. In all cases, it was agreed that Christian judges determining disputes between Jewish parties would decide the case according to Jewish law.
134
Doctrinal prohibitions (taken from responsa) strongly discouraging Jews from taking their disputes to secular courts, led generations of researchers to assume that few Jews opted for using Christian courts, and that those who did were pariahs. Nevertheless, recent research scrutinizing the parties in late medieval disputes in secular courts has indicated that many Jews across the Mediterranean chose to »venue shop,« sometimes preferring secular courts over Jewish ones. One recent monograph has gone so far as to conclude that their motivation stemmed from the fact that they deemed secular courts »more neutral, consistent, and powerful than the beit din.«
135
New Converts (conversos and moriscos) and their Communities in Early Modern Castile
Though Jewish and Islamic jurisdictions were extinguished formally in 1492 and 1502, respectively, normative structures continued to exist beyond the reach of the law. The Inquisition, originally chartered in Spain to defend the doctrinal barrier between conversos and Jews, continued its destruction even after the 1492 expulsion of the Jews, harassing and executing conversos in large numbers through the 1520s.
136 Evidence seems to suggest that by that point the remainders of 132 Ray (2006) institutional Judaism were sufficiently dispersed that few Jewish communities existed as such, even underground. Instead there were scattered families who attempted to preserve their tie to Jewish law through observance.
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These small communities were no doubt encouraged by surviving communities of crypto-Jews in Portugal, and openly practicing communities of Sephardic Jews in the Low Countries. There were even (at least) three jurisdictions of the Hispanic monarchy that tolerated Jewish communities wellpast the 1492 expulsion date: Naples, Milan, and Oran. The Jewish community of Naples disappeared first, weathering deteriorating conditions until its ultimate expulsion in the 1540s. As concerns Milan, Charles V took control of the city in 1535 as a result of his continental wars. When Philip II assumed the throne in 1556, the city was integrated into the Spanish Empire. Powerful interests within the city protected the Jews until they were ultimately expelled in 1597.
138 In Oran, a relatively stable Jewish community of roughly 500 persons remained until 1669.
139 To my knowledge, no legal historical study of these communities has been conducted to date. Closer insight into their organization and functioning would clearly contribute to a better understanding of the complexity of the Spanish Empire during the period in question.
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The so-called »Morisco« communities of Spain are intriguing for other reasons. While a very large proportion of the historiography has been dedicated to social and cultural questions related to the marginalization and persecution of these communities, there are indications that structures of authority in villages primarily inhabited by Moriscos remained relatively continuous before and after the forced conversions of the early 16 th century.
An important literature has dedicated itself to charting changes between the period of Mudéjar subjecthood and conversion to Christianity.
141 In Granada, the terms of the 1491 capitulation treaty assured that native Granadinos would continue to be judged by authorities in their own communities by their own laws.
142 First instance legal matters had been handled by a figure labeled as an alguacil in Castilian. Whenever those issues rose on appeal, they would be decided by qadis according to laws and traditions of the Koran.
143 However, qadis only exercised jurisdiction over civil matters.
144
Prior to the Christian conquest, village administration had been handled by the »buenos e viejos onbres« of the aljamas. Generally speaking, the aljama was a unit of organization associated with the existence of a mosque (with Friday service administered by an alfaqui), a representative organization (»buenos e viejos onbres« in this case), and external recognition as a juridical and administrative entity.
145 With the transition to Christian rule, those »buenos e viejos onbres« had been converted into regidores and alcaldes. Enrique Pérez Boyero, following the lead of Ángel Galán Sán-chez, has shown that government by »buenos e viejos onbres« persisted well into the 16 th century. Many official documents from rural towns primar- In a very careful analysis of notarial documents in Guadix, Carlos Javier Garrido García has argued that even though the juridical structure of the aljamas disappeared, the social structure endured. Case studies show that the important Mudéjar office of alguacil within the aljama was sometimes replaced by a hired procurador general who would lobby and handle legal matters on behalf of the community.
146 Other researchers have identified strong continuities between memberships of lateMudéjar period aljamas and post-1502 municipal councils. For instance, Isabelle Poutrin argues that aljamas in the rural areas of the Granada region under Crown authority survived as municipal councils, and scholars who study seigneurial jurisdictions in Granada and Murcia have noted similar findings for town councils there.
147 By way of comparison, for the Kingdom of Aragón, through legal trials, surviving Arabic language documents, and other means, scholars have been able to demonstrate the permanence of structures of Islamic authority up to the date of expulsion in the 17 th century.
148 Their work confirms the claims of the Granadino Jesuit Ignacio de las Casas, himself a descendant of Muslims. In a 1606 letter to the Pope, Las Casas decried the fact that numerous alfaquies, young and old, still administered a vibrant Islamic community in Valencia. 149 What studies from the kingdom of Castile have hinted at, and the ones from Aragón have indicated more broadly, is that Old Christian paranoia about the persistent normative force of Islam had significant basis in fact, at least in certain locales. In largely homogenous Morisco communities, in Castile located especially in the hinterlands of the Kingdom of Granada (as well as parts of Murcia and the city of Hornachos in Extremadura), municipal authorities handled large parts of governance according to ›custom‹. Mid-16 th -century prosecutions based on sartorial choices, eating habits, and personal hygiene -all part of the daily habitus targeted by zealous Christian authorities -linked back to real concerns about effective jurisdiction, and fear that local practices, inspired by a foreign legal system, were crowding out Castilian law.
Royal paranoia about the convergence between the two kinds of custom (costumbre) -cultural preferences in fashion, diet, and ceremony, on one hand, and repeated use creating customary law, on the other -reached its height in the mid1560s, leading to the publication of a Pragmática (1567) that introduced a sweeping set of royal prohibitions targeting behaviors the Crown linked to Islamic ›customs‹, ›superstitions‹, ›ceremonies‹, and ›rites‹. In response, Granada's native Morisco population commissioned the granadino Francisco Nuñez Muley to pen a response on its behalf. The resulting memorandum, presented to the president of the Granada Chancery (chancillería), made the case that speaking Arabic, wearing the almalafa (fully-body linen shawl for women), or bathing in the hammām were expressions of local culture, and that similar elements were acceptable among Maltese Christians. Yet the Crown and significant numbers of ecclesiastical and secular officials insisted that they were markers of jurisdictional affiliation.
150 Remie Constable pointed out that in the medieval period sumptuary laws requiring differentiated dress typically had been issued in order to encourage segregation. 16 th -cen- 146 Garrido García (2004 Of course, the concern of royal administrators and local agents about the effective reach of Castilian jurisdiction was a common concern in both southern Iberian and American contexts in the 16 th century. While local conditions -both cultural and political -were wildly different, a few ambitious scholars have sought grounds to conduct comparison. 152 The following pages will reflect on recent publications in Latin America on the exercise of local jurisdiction.
Indigenous Republics in the Americas
Latin American colonial historiography is moving away from an earlier emphasis on the »Two Republic« model, and increasingly acknowledging that each incorporated township constituted its own republic.
153 Zooming into local issues has also helped to reveal the mechanics of indigenous jurisdiction, in ways that were obscured by the earlier meta-scale. The first effort to rationalize native authorities within the Spanish system involved a process of translation. In generalizing terms, these pueblos could be governed either by a cacique (a Taíno expression that Spaniards adopted and employed widely across the Americas to signify a chieftain of a small political community) or by a commission of notables. The position of cacique, which did not exist in Castile, was incorporated into Castilian law for the Indies in the decades following Columbus's first voyage to the Caribbean. Soon, analog indigenous authoritiessuch as the office of kuraka in Perú, tlatoani in central Mexico, sihipkua / usaque in the northern Andes, and batab in the Yucatán -were grafted almost one-to-one onto the new concept.
154 Over the middle decades of the 16 th century, Spanish administrators did their best to relegate caciques to responsibilities of collecting tribute and marshalling labor forces, encouraging municipal officers, on the Spanish model, to replace their political authority.
155 Charles Gibson's work on Mesoamerica was the first to demonstrate that natives remapped pre-Hispanic positions of authority (beyond that of cacique) and structures of governance onto the titles provided by the Spanish cabildo (city council).
156 Often, native officials continued to fulfill administrative obligations that pre-dated Spanish conquest, even as their responsibilities were translated into the Spanish offices of gobernador, escribano, and even pregonero 157 in the Spanish cabildo.
Over recent decades, the growing focus on the local administration of justice has revealed how active native cabildo (city council) functionaries (alcaldes, regidores, alguaciles, and fiscales) were in regulating land use, resolving disputes, and enforcing (Spanish) ordinances. The offices filled by these new subjects of empire had their origin in a period of Castilian expansion. For instance, an organized system of designating alcaldes had originated in Castile in the 13 th century, and had further been modified under the Catholic Monarchs, Isabel and Ferdinand. Meanwhile, the offices of regidor and alguacil had become common in the 14 th century. The system underwent important changes in the 16 th century, as Felipe II made regidurías perpetual across the empire. Mumford (2012) 48, 152, proposes that while »república« in New Spain was typically understood to refer to a municipality, in Perú it referred to indigenous society in general. My research in the New Kingdom of Granada has revealed both usages, though the general use of »republic of the Indians« served more as a synonym for the pursuance of their »common good« than a reference to common judicial structures across native communities. 154 Gibson (1964) ; Stern (1982) ; ; Farriss (1984); Restall (1999); Lockhart (1992); Terraciano (2004) . 155 Stern (1982); Muñoz Arbeláez (2015) . 156 Gibson (1964) . 157 This post took on more importance in Andean contexts than it had in its Castilian conception. In parts of Peru, the pregonero seems to have been involved in the enforcement of justice; see Mumford (2012) reducción 159 -forced congregation in Europeanstyle urban settlements organized around a central plaza -created spaces where natives occupied offices of authority in the Spanish mold. This indigenous cabildo in each town effectively served as the court of first instance across the Americas.
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The functioning of the colonial cabildo was dynamic. Though a foreign Castilian structure, the Crown expected it to preserve many functions of local justice. Elections were held annually, though eligibility to vote varied from república to república.
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All the while, parallel indigenous systems of authority often continued to exist on the margins, questioning the validity of colonial compromise. As scholars have pointed out, Francisco de Toledo's ordinances in Peru made clear that the goal of the cabildo was to dilute the power of caciques within indigenous pueblos.
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New Spain
Far and away the most developed insight we have into the workings of early modern indigenous jurisdiction in the Americas comes from Mesoamerica. This is largely the result of a methodology called New Philology, championed in the United States by James Lockhart. The practitioners of the historical philological school have employed native language proficiency to mine mundane documents, such as notarial records and cabildo minutes, for clues about the culture and structure of indigenous communities that might have escaped the Spanish view. 163 This methodology has been much more successful in New Spain than elsewhere, because native language sources exist there in numbers unequaled in any other district of the Americas. This is perhaps due to the fact that native pictorial literacy there predated Spanish conquest, and numerous communities quickly picked up writing in Roman script. Because of the recordkeeping of native officials in Nahua, Zapotec, Mixtec, Otomí, and a variety of other languages, scholars of Mesoamerica have access to a wealth of sources created from an indigenous point of view that simply do not exist elsewhere in the Americas, or do in very limited numbers.
In an early contribution to this historiography, Sarah Cline studied the town of Culhuacan through its Nahuatl-language wills and testaments.
164 According to her analysis in these records, by the 1580s the structures of civil rule had changed to accommodate Spanish hierarchies and administrative relationships, though the basic functions of altepetl (city-state) justice remained intact. Culhuacan remained divided into residential wards (tlaxilacalli or calpulli).The imposition of Spanish rule entailed the reshaping of native institutions to accommodate the format of the Spanish concejo or cabildo. Through her work with testaments, Cline showed that lower levels of administration from the pre-conquest period, such as tax collection and land surveying (tequiticatepixqui and cohuatequitopile), persisted with Nahautl titles, while superior levels of administration took on Spanish ones. Usually the product of the transition was the creation of hybrid offices, continuous in many ways with the indigenous past, but with significant changes. In the pre-Hispanic period, the Aztecs had a system of justice with a clear hierarchy and formal practices. 165 In the colonial period, the juez-gobernador exercised much the same function as the tlatoani (dynastic ruler of a city state), though his post was elected instead of hereditary. The cabildo had two alcaldes, who exercised local jurisdiction, and four regidores, in charge of local administration. Alcaldes heard disputes and arbitrated, likely following the provision of justice in pre-Hispanic times very closely. But Indians also had access to Spanish courts. Moving the case to Spanish courts likely meant changing the framing of the dispute in order to litigate according to Spanish legal principles.
166 In Cline's analysis, Cline / León-Portilla (1984) . 165 Cline (1986 ) 43, 196 citing Offner (1983 . 166 On indigenous use of courts in New Spain, see Borah (1983); Owensby (2008) . Yanna Yannakakis emphasizes that indigenous litigants were aware that different tribunals were likely to interpret the character and validity of custom differently and steered their litigation accordingly. Yannakakis (2010) .
the alcaldes merely served as agents of the juezgobernador's authority, rather than operating independently. The creation of a post of alguacil, or constable, to maintain order was a novelty of the Hispanic period. The town had its own jail (teilpilpoyan) run by an indigenous alcaide. Adjudication of first instance in matters concerning residence, land transactions, and minor financial matters was actually handled by ward officials (calpulleque or tlaxilacalleque). The reach of this jurisdiction was reflected by natives' tendency to list their residence by ward in their testaments. Evidence of how 16 th -century Spanish jurists became familiar with preHispanic structures can be seen in the works of the former oidor (high court judge) of the Audiencia of Mexico, Alonso de Zorita.
167 An indigenous view of these structures is evident in the work of the Nahua historian Chimalpahin.
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The office of gobernador had been introduced in 1565 by the Viceroy Mendoza, who thought he was translating an indigenous office (tlatoani) into a Spanish nomenclature. But in fact, scholars agree that in the minds of the Nahua, he was creating something new.
169 William McConnell's study of Mexico City / Tenochtitlan revealed the process by which cabildo members were elected. Indigenous principales (pipiltin, hereditary nobles) elected governors and the cabildos who served under them. In the period immediately post-conquest, governors served for life and alcaldes and regidores rotated positions to avoid being unseated by regulations that prohibited reelection. But by the final decades of the 16 th century, mixed pressure from Spaniards and indigenous subjects coalesced in a durable system of annual elections, influenced by precedents in pre-contact Mexico.
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Robert Haskett's study of Cuernavaca revealed a cabildo that over the course of the 16 th century transitioned away from a Hispanic system of a governor (tlatoani), four regidores, and two alcaldes to one that more accurately reflected structures of authority that had survived the transfer of power. In addition to the gobernador, alcaldes, and regidores, it also boasted a fiscal (an assistant to the priest) as well as a number of lesser officers sporting a mixture of Spanish and Nahuatl titles: mayordomo, tequitlato, calpule, topile (alguacil) and jurado de tianquez (market official), and well as numerous huehuetque (elders) or principales. By the 17 th century, Cuernavaca had integrated two more alcaldes as well as four mayordomos. The mayordomos were ward supervisors who had been integrated into cabildo government.
171 Haskett repeats Cline's findings, namely that indigenous alcaldes had responsibilities that differed from their Iberian counterparts of the same name. They did likely adjudicate small local disputes, but they largely functioned as an extension of the gobernador's authority. Haskett notes that alcaldes often functioned as lieutenant governors, handling administrative matters and representing the municipality in exterior matters. Nevertheless, their adjudicative function was not completely lost. This is confirmed by such documents as the »Ordenanzas de Cuauhtinchán« 172 which spelled out a list of judicial responsibilities incumbent upon them.
Hildeberto Martínez's work on the city of Tepeaca and its surrounding towns from the preHispanic period through the 1 st century post-conquest revealed that before 1520, three or four tlatoani had shared governance over the connected towns, with premier authority designated on a rotating basis. Two decades later, when the Spanish cabildo was introduced, the larger city (Tepeaca) took on a full range of cabildo members, while surrounding settlements made do with a more limited cast. After the 1550s, the gobernador, regidores, and alcaldes were elected regularly (every year or two), and were allotted according to a rotation between the cabecera (head-settlement) and the subject towns. Martínez remarks that this division of authority and representation thus continued to heavily resemble pre-Hispanic models, albeit under the guise of Spanish structures.
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Caterina Pizzigoni's work on wills in Toluca in the 17 th and 18 th centuries give some sense of 167 Zorita (1963) . Analyzed in Egío (2016); Vigil (1987 ) 178-179. 168 Anderson / Schroeder (1997 . 169 Connell (2011); Lockhart (1992) 30-31, 132-138; Haskett (1991 ) 100-101. 170 Connell (2011 ). 171 Haskett (1991 172 Reyes García (1972 ) 259-263. 173 Martínez (1984 th century the juez-gobernador had lost the broad mandate exercised by the pre-Hispanic tlatoani, but still served as an important representative of the community and resolved of disputes. She notes a tendency for the number of alcaldes serving on a town council to balloon from the typical number of two, to include wardens of the tlaxicalli that in a previous period had occupied an inferior rung on the scale of justice. Meanwhile, Pizzigoni notes that while the position of regidor was prestigious in Spanish context, on Mesoamerican municipal councils they were less important than alcaldes and, indeed, eventually disappeared from the list of municipal offices.
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Finally, Tlaxcala has occupied a special place in the historiography. Representing among the earliest and most faithful allies of Spanish conquistadors, the city's leadership in the mid-16 th century negotiated recognition as a »noble and loyal city« of the Crown, whose inhabitants would be immune from taxation commonly imposed on subjugated communities.
175 The city-republic is an especially useful example for historians because the Actas of its cabildo have been preserved and transcribed.
176 Access to this special resource has made it a privileged space for studying indigenous jurisdiction.
177 Jovita Baber has argued that the activity of the indigenous representative leadership of Tlaxcala both within the structure of a Spanishstyle cabildo system and as emissaries in front of the royal court reflects a hybridization between native cultural and political forms and those imposed by the Spanish. From this example, Baber proposes Tlaxcala as an especially well-documented example whose insights can be generalized across the Indies. 178 And precisely because of its valuable records of the minutiae of daily governance, the Tlaxcala example has indeed been used analogically to fill in documentary lacunae elsewhere.
Peru
Beginning in the late 1970s, Andean ethnohistory began to dedicate more energy to the question of legal transformations during the colonial period. Seminal publications attentive to transformations in ethnic authority in Peru noted the ›Casti-lianization‹ of cacical authority and the increasing marginalization of caciques between the 16 th and 17 th centuries. 179 Pre-Hispanic political culture had been defined by nested Inca organizational system coordinated around the ayllu, the basic unit of population and production united around shared kinship. Ayllus in turn formed part of waranqas, a Quechua term that translated as the number one thousand. Postconquest records suggest that waranqas were landholding units, and only reflected the populations of indigenous communities in a very approximate manner. Karen Spalding detailed how waranqas, most probably representing exceptionally large ayllus, would be transformed into the constituent units of a Spanish-era repartimiento (a population unit she refers to as a tribe). In both pre-Hispanic and post-conquest times, local justice within the repartimiento was administered by kurakas (a rough equivalent to the Spanish cacique) and their subordinate principales. These repartimientos, in turn, formed part of provinces, which were divided into anansaya and urinsaya, upper and lower level moieties. Typically, the kuraka representing the constituent groups of the upper (anansaya) moiety ruled over the rest.
Beginning in the late 1540s (and in an accelerated fashion under the viceroy Francisco de Toledo), the monarchy had pushed the plan of reducción, to concentrate indigenous settlements into Spanish ideal-type urban grids. A complementary part of that plan included introducing the Spanish city council (cabildo) and city council offices (alcalde, regidor, alguacil mayor, mayordomo, pregonero, verdugo, andescribano) to indigenous townships.
Despite the new introductions, the position of kuraka did not disappear, and in fact, kurakas remained a vital cog in colonial society for their work as middlemen, crucial in mobilizing labor drafts (mita). Karen Graubart has demonstrated how the cacique, and later the cabildo, retained jurisdiction over minor civil and criminal matters, and has argued that colonial administrators conceived indigenous jurisdiction through the lens of the autonomy once conceded to the former Jewish and Muslim aljamas in Iberia.
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With the growth and expansion of the Spanish colony, the monarchy created the positions of alcalde mayor de quipucamayoq y contador de los chasquis, capitán general de la mita, and alcalde mayor de la mita (for Potosí), employing members of the hereditary native elite to manage large-scale endeavors that involved indigenous inhabitants from multiple provinces. Nevertheless, within decades the new Spanish-style officers essentially dominated urban governance.
181 Nevertheless, much of the preexisting structure remained intact and Spanish jurists reiterated the importance of heeding the value of indigenous customary law. The second book of the Tomo primero de las ordenanzas del Perú (1685), compiled under the orders of the viceroy Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull, Duque de la Palata and titled »Ordenanzas de los Indios«, remains a remarkably valuable source for evaluating the overlap between Spanish structure and indigenous custom.
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Much of the revision of the last decade has focused on indigenous participation in literate culture.
183 But because Andean archives lack a large corpus of native language documents like the ones that exist in Mesoamerica, penetrating the cabildo has been comparatively difficult. Recent breakthroughs have involved using insights from Mesoamerican documents to fill in interpretative gaps and identifying evidence of the exercise of local jurisdiction appended to casework in litigation that was elevated on appeal. 184 The limited documentation discovered so far by researchers suggests that Andean cabildos consisted of the same officials that occupied the model provided in early modern Spain and similar to the one in New Spain: two alcaldes, a number of regidores (likely to not exceed eight), an alguacil mayor, a scribe, and a handful of lesser officials.
185 Sparse as the evidence may be, the presence of community-elected alcaldes, who rendered summary judgment on civil issues involving sums of 50 pesos or fewer and criminal issues not involving homicide and who did so drawing upon a mixture of Castilian and customary law, points to a much deeper integration of native communities into Spanish frameworks of justice in the early decades than was commonly acknowledged even ten years ago.
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Though many gaps remain to be filled in, the new monograph by José Carlos de la Puente Luna, Andean Cosmopolitans, offers important insight into the engagement of the inhabitants of the Jauja valley with the Spanish legal system, both as its subjects and as actors.
187 Scholars working on the 18 th century have recently illustrated the efforts of indigenous legal actors who carved out space for indigenous legal representation at the highest levels.
188 But Puente's laborious study of letters of attorney, trial records, and vice-regal writings has not only pushed that chronology back -revealing active indigenous legal representation in both Lima and Castile as far back as the 16 th century
189
-it has also revealed the role that native procuradores played in indigenous local government. In an effort aimed at »recentering the pueblo,« Puente has made a convincing argument that natives from Jauja (and by inference from the surrounding Andean areas) quickly incorporated Spanish-style litigation as sapçi, a Quechua term that denotes common assets belonging to a community, politi-cally-controlled and intended to be used for the collective good. Ayllus came to see community litigation (pleitos del común) -seeking, for instance, community-wide exemption from the mita labor draft -as a collective good on par with public food stockpiles or common lands. Puente traces how individuals he calls »town attorneys« were elected annually along with the cabildo and came to be seen as emblems of corporate identity vis-à-vis other pueblos as well as the Spanish community. Interestingly, caciques sometimes took on these roles, muddling our understanding of the division between pre-Hispanic authorities and officers of the newly-introduced cabildo.
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Finally, recent research has highlighted the exceptional character of the vice-regal capital of Lima, which because of its centrality seems to have developed a unique indigenous jurisdiction with its own special set of characteristics. Already by the 1550s, Spanish authorities had begun to appoint native officials to serve as magistrates handling minor indigenous disputes within the city. By the 1560s, indigenous alcaldes and alguaciles were formally constituted. In the subsequent decade, when the native district El Cercado was established as an appendix of the city, it began to accrue its own set of unique officials. The erection of a wall around this district of the town, Karen Graubart has asserted, made it a safe place for indigenous customary law to flourish. Indigenous alcaldes adjudicated disputes that arose within the walled neighborhood. As the population grew, a hierarchy of jurisdictions grew to include an alcalde mayor de los naturales, who served as an appeals judge on nativeto-native issues within El Cercado, as well as an alguacil mayor, in charge of overseeing works concerning public order. But unlike their direct inferiors, who were elected by their communities, Puente Luna points out that these two prestigious posts were political appointees made with Spanish oversight.
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New Avenues for Study
As we dive deeper into the local in the Spanish Empire, what methodologies can we benefit from? One fruitful opportunity is offered by the concept of interlegality. André Hoekema, the most insistent proponent of interlegality as an analytical tool, defines it as »a process of adoption of elements of a dominant legal order … and of the frameworks of meaning that constitute these orders, into the practices of a local legal order and / or vice versa.« He further acknowledges that the process also carries an implied result -the hybridization of coexisting ›legal orders‹.
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In this article's opening vignette, I explored how Spanish judges determined that indigenous inheritance custom was valid and, in fact, trumped existing Castilian inheritance law, insofar as that law was to be applied to the native community. This was an example of a structural interlegality particular to the Castilian legal system. Often times, we see indigenous norms (that did not violate precepts of Christianity, always a requirement) explicitly re-appropriated within Spanish statutes. For instance, in the 1570s Viceroy Francisco de Toledo of Peru reinstated an Inca law that Andean highlanders could not be forced into mita rotations in the lowlands for more than 24 days, and encouraged another norm that mandated that caciques host public meals for the poor.
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But indigenous systems might also take on features of the Castilian legal culture surrounding them. This was the case roughly forty years later, when in 1617 don Pedro, cacique of the pueblo of Cheva in the New Kingdom of Granada made a last will and testament with a Spanish notary. In that document, don Pedro identified his nephew don Juan, the four year-old son of his sister doña Juana, as his rightful heir. And don Pedro used the testament to assure that goods belonging to the cacicazgo (chieftainship) -a farm, livestock, or-190 Puente Luna (2018) 20-50. Also on apoderados for a later period in New Spain, see Yannakakis (2008) . In the interest of connecting historiographies, it should also be noted that the equivalent of such »town attorneys« represented heavily-Morisco populations, such as those in the Alpujarras, in front of the royal during roughly the same period (see footnotes 146-148). chards, and blanket stockpiles (a common tributary item and basic unit of exchange) -stayed with the regents (doña Juana and an unnamed gobernador) until the nephew came of age and assumed the cacicazgo. Like him, the incoming cacique would be required to use these common goods to pay the tribute obligations of the poor and elderly in the pueblo.
194 Not only does this will illustrate the continuing validity and observation of indigenous custom in the inheritance of authority, it also highlights the flow of interlegality in the other direction. In this case, a foreign legal form (the will) could become a legitimate instrument facilitating smooth transitions within the pueblo according to customary law. The interpenetration of semi-autonomous bodies of norms proved crucial in the elaboration of local frameworks of meaning both flexible and simultaneously cohesive enough with central legal tenets to sustain a durable political system.
The best evidence of interlegality is likely to come from cabildo records, and specifically the decisions of judges of first instance, the alcaldes ordinarios. Unfortunately few indigenous cabildo records from the early colonial Andes -either from Perú or the New Kingdom of Granada, from which the above examples came -seem to have survived. However, a recent analysis of one of these scant records shows indigenous judges making rulings based on Castilian law but with distinct Andean features. 195 The work of Puente Luna and Honores highlights indigenous actors working within the structure of Spanish justice to provide decisions that sampled liberally from both Iberian and native traditions. In such interactions between two legal systems, Hoekema's framework for examining interlegality encourages attentiveness to the relationship between dominant and local legal order. This leads me to an observation. Concerning the setting of early 17 th -century Andes, which -I ask -was the dominant legal order? Our modern familiarity with the written Castilian law might lead us to make rash assumptions. For if we look at demographics at the end of the 16 th century in the territories the Habsburg Crown claimed in Peru, there were only tens of thousands of Europeans, but millions of native Andeans. Spaniards claimed hegemony; but given the demographic disparity, how seriously should those claims be taken, especially in this early period?
To be sure, there was great diversity in the indigenous community, constituting a patchwork of normative communities. But sometimes, frankly, our reconstructions of the 16 th century reminds me of the old historian's saw about the man who has lost his keys in the dark and goes out to look for them. When his friend, apprised of the situation, sees him very anxiously fumbling through the grass surrounding a lamppost, the friend inquires why he is so intent to search there, rather than looking through the surrounding field or the pathway that continues on into the distance. The anxious man responds, »Well, this is where the light is.« This leads me to another avenue for future study, that of hidden jurisdictions. By this, I refer to normative spheres not recognized by the sovereign power but with capacity to direct the administration of justice on a local or regional level. To be relevant to this particular essay, they must reflect the norms of some republic, a community that imagines itself as a cohesive whole and whose members share common future objectives. In the early modern world of conquest, dislocation, and plural, contested space, the opportunities for such hidden jurisdictions are numerous. The case of Granada's Moriscos makes clear that the structures of Mudéjar justice outlasted nominal conversion to Christianity and wholesale insertion into the Castilian ius commune. The War of the Alpujarras (1568-1570) in the kingdom of Granada was essentially a civil war started over the native community's right to observe and to continue to apply a substrate of customary law. The same can be said of Spanish »extirpation of idolatry« campaigns in the Americas.
196 Almost every extirpation campaign revealed non-Christian beliefs, yes, but also parallel systems of authority and justice. The »cus-toms and rites« that Spanish ecclesiastics endlessly harped on about were no less than the surface manifestations of competing legal systems. As just one example, Jorge Gamboa's analysis of a trial in the New Kingdom of Granada during the last 194 Archivo Regional Boyacense (ARB), N2, leg. 84, 23v-24v. 195 Puente Luna / Honores (2016 ). 196 Clendinnen (1987 Mills (1997); Tavárez (2013); Puente Luna (2007) .
quarter of the 16 th century, in which one faction in an indigenous pueblo was accused of idolatry and other sins, revealed definitely non-Christian practices for the coronation of authority and wholly proprietary mechanisms for pursuing damages in the case of wrongful death.
197 I suggest that we continue tugging at all the available strands, following hints of normative modeling through as many documentary types as possible -legal trials, notarial records, pragmatic books, chronicles -in order to better recognize the shape, reach, and unequal authority of early modern and colonial jurisdictions. Digging through the evidence of idolatry campaigns and similar legal trials -to be complemented by clues in last wills and testaments -we can see the outline of systems of justice that worked from different precepts and envisioned the transfer of authority in different ways.
These hidden jurisdictions become most legible to us when they begin to overlap with structures of Castilian authority. The New Philology school of research, by drawing upon indigenous language records, has often been able get the closest to indigenous actors working within the Spanish system but according to native structures of thought. Recent advances in the study of judicial linguistic translation -conducted with the Zapotec-language records of Villa Alta (New Spain) -have revealed how the Spanish justice system could be tuned to play in a very locally-relevant key.
198 As Spanish and indigenous systems of justice gradually developed symbiotic relationships, even hybrid ones, hidden jurisdictions had the tendency to come out into the open.
So-called functional communities also offer a privileged viewpoint for examining the workings of customary law in the Spanish Empire. According to Brian Tamanaha, functional normative systems are those that take shape »in the pursuit of a particular function, purpose or activity that goes beyond purely commercial pursuits … [which] possess some degree of autonomy and self-governance aimed at achieving the purpose for which they are constituted … and … interact with official legal systems at various junctures …« 199 Functional communities represent ›republics‹ in the most fundamental sense of the word -communities of people constituted through common interest and devoted to a »common good« (res publica). Educational communities, religious communities, and guilds provide the most numerous examples of such functional groups. How might one examine these as legal-historical objects? One study of the famed University of Salamanca examined the jurisdiction exercised by the maestrescuela of that institution, scrutinizing the University's distinctive authority in relation to royal and papal jurisdiction. It focused on students and their nuclear family members, as well as their employees and servants, who enjoyed the university fuero, as did university officials, members of any affiliated colegios, convents, or monasteries, and all employees of the University's independent tribunal.
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Universities in general, and the University of Salamanca in particular, were elite institutions, but a great majority of the functional communities that coalesced and exercised their own (limited) jurisdiction were not. Confraternities did not enjoy a right to their own fuero in the way that universities did, but they did exert normative pressure and condition the behavior of their individual members. In theory, confraternities were pious and charitable institutions that organized public events to advertise their social functions. In practice, though, they often took on the character of extralegal normative bodies for minority communities within Christian society. Such a reality was not restricted to the Americas. Late medieval Toledo was home to some of the most important political confrontations between Old Christians and conversos throughout the 15 th century. In 1481, the archbishop of Toledo devoted a synod statute to decrying the creation of ethnically-specific confraternities, recognizing by so doing that these brotherhoods were creating normative communities that competed with secular and ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
201 One intriguing example comes from an Islamic brotherhood in that city, 197 Gamboa Mendoza (2004) . 198 Yannakakis / Schrader-Kniffki (2016 ). 199 Tamanaha (2008 from a document rescued from obscurity by Ana Echevarría. Taken from Toledo in the early 15 th century, the eleven-folio document written in Arabic names members of a Mudéjar ›congre-gation‹ in that city. Because of vagaries of translation, the community to which it refers could either be a confraternity or an aljama, but in either case Echevarría demonstrates that it is a normative document that details not only the financing, but also the regulation of a voluntary community of Mudéjars.
202
Often an »ethnic refuge« in colonial Spanish America, 203 confraternities provided structure for displaced communities by offering them formal organizations with statutes and regulations, through which they were able to reconstruct normative communities. 204 In her survey of early colonial African confraternities in Lima, Karen Graubart has tentatively suggested that the leadership of black colonial confraternities mimicked the office of alcalde de los negros that had been created in 15 th -century Seville to oversee that city's African community. 205 Teresa Vergara has argued convincingly that in 17 th -century Lima, the indigenous shoemakers of the city combatted their exclusion from the official shoemakers' union (gremio) by founding a confraternity that served as an unofficial guild for their own practice of the profession.
206 Serge Gruzinski has suggested that in Oaxaca, certain confraternities eventually transformed into pueblos de indios with their own alcaldes and regidores. 207 Nicole von Germeten has analyzed Black and Mulatto confraternity constitutions in Veracruz, demonstrating how their norms regulated both financial concerns and behavior of members. 208 In her analysis of an alleged uprising in 1612 New Spain, María Elena Martínez suggested that Black confraternities in the city of Mexico had a political function and that their hierarchical structure was the intended basis for a new administration in the case of a successful rebellion. 209 Though outside the temporal boundary of this study, Matt Childs's work on latecolonial Afro-Cuban cabildos is also worth noting. Building off of a burgeoning historiography, he has shown that ethnically-specific cabildos (Kongo, Lucumi, Carabali, Mina, Mandinga, etc.) developed out of the Spanish institution of the confraternity, and they regularly took on the responsibility of conflict resolution among their members. 210 His findings from the 18 th and 19 th centuries encourage us to look inside the confraternity for evidence of jurisdiction. And indeed, in 16 th -century Granada, territory of the last Islamic kingdom to surrender to the Crown, Amalia Garcia Pedraza has shown how the confraternity of the Resurrection, organized around the city's hospital, exclusively served the town's native community (former subjects of the Nasrid dynasty) and may, potentially, have been involved in the planning of the Rebellion of the Alpujarras (1568-1570).
211 These examples hint that minorities and marginal communities adopted confraternities, sanctioned by Christian authorities, as vehicles for self-governance with clear structures of authority and mechanisms for fundraising. Understanding how such distinct communities -formed by »ethno-cultural minorities, by indigenous peoples, by religious communities, by communes, by distinct smallholder groups and tribes, etc.« in the words of André Hoekema 212 -functioned as normative bodies, and achieved some sort of official recognition (or conversely, did not), remains a particularly attractive research prospect.
Finally, I want to point to the potential for reconceptualization of the »republican« form of self-government. Recent work by the anthropologist Joanne Rappaport has pointed to the fact that self-identification is often situational, and that social forms of division and cohesion do not always match the lines that bureaucratic governments try to draw. Simply said, »groupness« does not necessarily obey the categories created by law. 213 She demonstrates how certain individuals in the colonial Americas could be simultaneously Spaniards and Indians, and even act as constituents in an emerging category with its own normative arrogations, such as mestizo, at the same time. Putting her insights together with those drawn from the recent literature on multinormativity, 214 a blurry picture of coexisting and overlapping normative spheres emerges. Rappaport's focus on »groupness« highlights the potential for an individual to be constituent in, and answerable to, multiple normative republics at the same time. This multiple association is unproblematic for our purposes, until the individual engages or is engaged by the Spanish legal system for the purposes of conflict resolution. Identifying and picking apart these liminal cases is promising not only for what it can tell us about the overlapping normative spheres to which an individual belongs, but also because close attention to how contemporary legal scholars undertook the process of deciding jurisdiction can highlight how the early modern understanding of jurisdictional divisions might have differed from our modern deductions.
Conclusion
We have arrived at a fruitful moment in legal historical studies of the Iberian World. Scholars long ago identified the basic structures of multiconfessional society in medieval Iberia. But only recently have advances been made in recognizing continuity in normative social structures after the period of forced conversions ending in 1502. Meanwhile, for the Americas, there has been a slow march, starting in earnest after the first publications of the school of New Philology in the early 1980s, to recognizing the structures of native authorities in the Americas and how they adapted to serve the needs of their communities under Spanish rule. Recent advances in the study of legal history have made significant strides in recognizing the role of custom in the administration of justice. The sum of these realizations and advances is transforming our understanding of the relationship between justice, law, and society in the early modern Spanish Empire. Much more than a system governed by grand concepts and administered by authoritarian ministers in Madrid, justice appears a much more local and contingent affair. New propositions from studies of legal pluralism, which identify a historical universe that generates normativity from a variety of sources, legal and non-legal, prompts a turn toward the local, and begs us to re-focus our energies on paralegal bodies, such as the confraternity or the indigenous social event as spaces for the construction of hidden jurisdictions, not sanctioned by the Spanish legal system, but nevertheless effective in guiding human action.
How does a look at recent work in legal history affect our understanding of convivencia as a concept? Traditional writing on the topic circumscribed its focus to the period of Iberian history in which the three religions tolerated one another's beliefs and their right to decide internal disputes according to the legal structures underlying those beliefs. Two things are worth noting in that regard. First, there is some evidence that the medieval relationships behind such a convivencia did not completely disappear by 1502. Instead, anecdotal evidence from within Iberian seigneurial territories suggests local Islamic jurisdiction in some places may have survived relatively unmolested into the 1560s. Furthermore, if we were to measure only by the yardstick of non-intervention in the Other's religious cult, and the relinquishment of local jurisdiction over internal matters, during a number of decades Latin America (albeit unevenly) does not look terribly different than 15 th -century Iberia. Though the Crown and its ministers celebrated their many conversions in the Americas, even at the end of the 16 th century many natives had not yet been baptized and so occupied a complicated legal situation that left them free from some elements of Castilian jurisdiction.
215 Second, the immense power of custom in the Spanish legal system devolved norm-creation to the local level. On the one hand, this meant that across its many territories, the Castilian system was characterized by an intense and ever-present interlegality. In practice, this created significant space for accommodation that -while not a tolerance on par with medieval privileges accorded to Jews and Muslims -expanded the range of licit behaviors and devices for conflict resolution outside of the range explicitly prescribed by Castilian law. That begs the question, if a Castilian convivencia ever did exist in the first place, did it indeed disappear in 1502? Or did it merely transform?  215 AGI, Santa Fe, leg. 528, Bibliography
